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REVENUE ACT OF 1939
By ALBERT J. GOULD, of the Denver Bar
HILE the Revenue Act of 1939 did not make many
changes which are of immediate interest to lawyers,
nevertheless, a survey of the more important changes
seem
to be valuable to the members of the bar. It is
would
not my purpose to analyze these changes in too much detail,
but merely to give the high-lights, in order that attorneys may
be advised and make the necessary complete investigation of
the law, if and when these points arise in their practice.
1. A Corporation Having an Unsound Financial
Structure is permitted to discharge an indebtedness for which
it is liable and which is evidenced by securities in existence on
June 1, 1939, at less than the face value thereof, without accounting for the difference between the face value and the purchase price as income. A security is defined as any bond, note,
certificate, debenture or other evidence of indebtedness issued
or assumed by the corporation. Specific provision is made
whereby the corporation may establish its unsound financial
condition for the above purposes.
2. Declared Value of Capital Stock May Be Re-Declared by Increasing Same, but not by decreasing same. In
the capital stock tax returns to be filed in 1939 and 1940, a
corporation may increase the declared value of its capital stock,
thereby paying an additional tax at the rate of $1 per thousand, but by so doing it may avoid an excess profits tax of 6 %
to 12 % upon its net income in excess of 10 % of its re-declared
value of its capital stock. By the 1938 Act, a re-declaration
was not permitted until July, 1941. The 1939 return may
be filed on or before August 31, 1939, but the 1940 return
must be filed in July, 1940.
3. Net OperatingBusiness Losses of corporations, individuals, estates and trusts for taxable years, beginning after
December 31, 1938, may be carried over to two subsequent
years. This provision permits taxpayers to deduct net operating business losses from net income for the next succeeding
year, and if there is any excess, it may be deducted from net
income for the second succeeding year.
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This provision is particularly important to taxpayers
whose profits and losses fluctuate sharply and to new enterprises which may not be profitable in the first year of their
organization. From the standpoint of individuals, business
losses sustained in poor years will serve to reduce surtax rates
to which an individual might be liable in profitable years.
An excess of losses over gains sustained by the disposition of capital assets may not be carried over, regardless of
whether the capital gains and losses are long term or short
term. The above benefits apply strictly to net operating business losses.
4. Capital Losses of Corporations. Capital losses on
assets held for more than eighteen months may be deducted
by corporations from ordinary net income, contrary to the
former provision limiting such losses to $2,000. The above
provisions are applicable to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1939. Corporations having large potential capital losses should not sell said assets, if possible, until after the
beginning of a taxable year beginning after December 31,
1939. Corporations whose fiscal years are not identical with
the calendar year may have to suspend this action until late in
1939, but consideration should be given to the effect of this
new provision.
It must be remembered, however, that the net loss carryover permitted by the 1939 Act does not apply to net capital
losses.
5. "Last-In-First-Out" Inventory Option granted by
the 1939 Act for the calendar year 1939 and subsequent taxable years is of immediate importance to all taxpayers engaged
in businesses involving substantial inventories, and tax attorneys and accountants at once should recommend to their clients having substantial inventories that they consider placing
their regular accounting procedure completely upon a last-infirst-out basis.
The method is to treat the goods remaining on hand at
the close of the taxable year, for the purposes of determining
the cost of those sold during the year, as being, first, those included in the opening inventory of the taxable year in the
order of acquisition of the goods so included; and second,
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those acquired in the taxable year. When this method is used
the inventory must be taken at cost.
The effect of the foregoing provision is to permit taxpayers to treat articles sold during the year as having been sold out
of inventory acquired during the year (to the extent thereof)
without regard to identity. In the event of a rising commodity market, the taxpayer's net profits, under this method,
would be less than if inventoried articles on hand at the first
of the year had been sold at a greater margin of profit. (For
method of valuing inventory, see Article 22 (d-1) (Reg.
101 ) under the 1 938 Act, which it is assumed will be followed
in the new regulations to be issued under the 1939 Act.)
6. Stock Dividends or Stock Rights. For some time
there has been confusion as to the basis in the hands of the taxpayer of non-taxable stock dividends or stock rights. The
1939 Act has removed this confusion by providing that the
cost basis of the shares on which the dividend is declared shall
be allocated between said shares and the dividend stock or
rights, in computing gain or loss on a subsequent sale. This
provision is retroactive to February 28, 1913, and taxpayers
who have sold stock dividends and have reported their .receipts
as profit in full may file petition for refund, if not barred by
the statute of limitations, which is three years from the date
the return was filed, or two years from the date the tax was
paid. Profit or loss from future sales of stock or rights heretofore received as non-taxable dividends will be determined
by this section.
7. Compensation for Services Over Five Years. Attorneys will be interested in the provision in the 1939 Act which
permits the taxpayer, upon receipt of compensation for personal services rendered over a period of five years or more, to
pro-rate the same over said period, provided 95% or more of
the compensation is paid upon completion of the service. Contingent fees in extended litigation often will come within this
classification.
8. New Corporation Tax Rates. For taxable years
beginning after December 31, 1939, net income of corporations will be taxed as follows:
For corporations earning in excess of $25,000, a flat tax of 18%;
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For corporations earning less than $25,000, 122% of the first
$5,000, 14% of the next $15,000, 16% of the last $5,000;
Corporations earning slightly over $25,000 will pay, first, 18%
of their normal tax net income, or, second, $3,525, plus 32% of the
amount of the normal tax net income in excess of $25,000, whichever
is less. The $3,525 figure is the full tax for corporations earning
$25,000 under the above schedule.

9. Individual Tax Rates. No change.
10. Stamp Tax. The 1939 Act permits transfer of
stock by an executor or administrator without stamp taxes, if
the value of the shares is not greater than the amount of the
tax that otherwise would be imposed.

AUGMENTING THE ANOMALOUSNESS OF THE
ANOMALOUS INDORSER
By R. HICKMAN WALKER, of the Denver Bar
HIS relates to Winton vs. Sullivan, 104 Colo. 450, decided June 12, 1939. En Banc. No dissent. Mr. Justice Francis E. Bouck not participating. Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bock.
The writer hereof would not have been bothered by
Winton vs. Sullivan if it were not for the fact, intrinsically
unimportant, that during a period of years he personally conducted annual excursions at a nearby university into the alien
scenery of the Law Merchant. Among the curiosities rather
closely examined on these explorations was the Anomalous
Indorser. This was the accommodating person who, prior to
the delivery of a negotiable instrument, wrote his name upon
the back thereof for the purpose of lending credit to the maker
or payee and without sustaining any other relation to the instrument. Before the adoption of N. I. L. (a symbol, perhaps, also of what is generally known about it) there was no
uniformity in the views of the courts of the United States as
to the nature of the contract of the anomalous indorser. Some
courts held that his contract was that of an indorser; others
that his contract was that of a maker (in the case of a note) ;
and still others that his contract was to be established by parol
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evidence. Colorado'held to the second of these views. Good
vs. Martin, 1 Colo. 165; Kiskadden vs. Allen, 7 Colo. 206;
Tabor vs. Miles, 5 Colo. App. 127; Byers vs. Tritch, 12 Colo.
App. 377; Edmonston vs. Ascough, 43 Colo. 55.
Among the purposes (as it is alleged) of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law was the removal of the conflict
in authority above noted. 10 C. J. S. 468. The section
designed for this purpose is found as Section 64, Chapter 112,
'35 C. S. A., reading in part as follows:
"Where a person, not otherwise a party to an instrument, places
thereon his signature in blank before delivery, he is liable as indorser in
accordance with the following rules:
"First-If the instrument is payable to the order of a third person,
he is liable to the payee and to all subsequent parties."

To take a bond of fate upon this particular question and
also to cover other similar situations, Section 63, Id., reads:
"A person placing his signature upon an instrument otherwise
than as maker, drawer or acceptor is deemed to be an indorser unless he
clearly indicates by appropriate words his intention to be bound in some
other capacity."

In Edmonston vs. Ascough, supra, Edmonston signed on
the face of the note below the maker's signature, adding the
word "surety" and so the court said:
"We do not consider what the effect would have been under our

negotiable instrument law had Edmonston's name been indorsed in
blank on the back of the instrument. Prior to the adoption of that law
this would have made no difference; he would, even had he signed solely
for the accommodation of Dustin, have been regarded as a joint maker."

In this state of the law, and probably ignorant of it, the
aforesaid Sullivan, prior to the delivery of a note to the payee,
indorsed it as follows: "Demand, notice and protest waived.
Payment guaranteed. E.J.Sullivan." Thereafter the holder
accepted from a person claiming to be the trustee for the creditors of the maker twenty per cent of the amount due "in full
satisfaction of all indebtedness to the payee" from the maker.
However, the holder credited upon the note only the amount
so received, and afterwards transferred it to the plaintiff Winton. Sullivan contended that he was discharged from liability
under the note by the following provision of the Act (Section
120, Chapter 112, C. S. A.):
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"A person secondarily liable on the instrument is discharged: * * *
"Fifth-By a release of the principal debtor unless the holder's
right of recourse against the party secondarily liable is expressly reserved."

Apparently he also contended that he was to be deemed
a mere guarantor and not an indorser, and therefore released
by the settlement made between the holder and the maker.
As its first task the opinion addressed itself to the proposition that notwithstanding the phrase "payment guaranteed," the writing on the back of the note was a commercial
indorsement and Sullivan an indorser. This task the opinion
performed with vigor and considerable success, and with an
imposing show of authorities. Up to this point the mind
perusing the opinion feels no particular strain, and looks confidently ahead to an early and easy solution of the problem.
For if, as the court has thus established, Sullivan's contract
was not merely a guaranty, then there stands Section 64 precisely prepared to take care of the situation and to say what
Sullivan's liability is, namely, that "he is liable as indorser"
to the payee and to all subsequent parties. The court, however, finds it unnecessary or deems it unworthy to invoke such
obvious support for its conclusion that Sullivan is indorser,
and this perhaps is not important except to sensitive friends
of Section 64. What is important is that Sullivan, at pages
454 and 455 of the opinion, is given such assurance that he
occupies the position of indorser that it would seem he could
relax and enjoy the remainder of the opinion. For, being an
indorser, his first and excusable impression is that he is a party
"secondarily liable" (as indorsers typically are) and therefore
released in accordance with the terms of Section 120, supra.
His security, however, is both false and transient, for the court
makes an indorser out of him in order to destroy him, and this
it does by the disconcerting announcement of a general rule to
the effect that an accommodation party is primarily liable.
The Negotiable Instrument Act itself has its own notion of
what constitutes primary liability, since it says: "The person
primarily liable on an instrument is the person who by the
terms of the instrument is absolutely required to pay the same.
All other parties are secondarily liable." The Act therefore
distinguishes primary from secondary liability by the terms of
the contract. The court appears to ground its distinction upon
the presence or absence of consideration given for the contract.
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In other words, under the rule of Winton vs. Sullivan, one
who writes his name upon the back of a note to accommodate
his friend, the maker, becomes primarily liable, but one who
demands twenty-five dollars for the same service is only secondarily liable. The only decision cited in support of this
distinction is Hall vs. Farmers Bank, 74 Colo. 165, in which
case it was held that one who signed as a maker for the accommodation of the co-maker was primarily liable and that the
rules of suretyship were not applicable to such a situation.
That holding, of course, was inevitable since the accommodating contract by its terms was a primary contract, namely, that
of a maker. Under Winton vs. Sullivan, however, if you
wish to be safe, you have to be mercenary. If you wish to preserve the rights of an indorser, you have to charge for your
indorsement.
It might have been a pretty question in Winton vs. Sullivan whether the waiver of demand, notice and protest contained in the indorsement did not have the effect of making the
indorser's liability primary. There are some courts that have
said that it would, but others have held to the contrary, and
it does seem as if an indorser could waive demand, notice and
protest without also waiving the right which an indorser has
to have the contract between the maker and the holder kept
intact as against the maker. We do not, however, find in Winton vs. Sullivan any airing of this question. It is true the
opinion says as a preface to the discussion of the question of
guarantor or indorser, that there is no contention nor any facts
to support one if made "that the indorsement on the note
signed by defendant is a collateral contract or undertaking and
not a direct liability." This seems at best but a remote allusion
to the effect of the waiver in Sullivan's indorsement, and other
portions of the opinion seem to indicate that this waiver was
playing no part in the reasoning of the court, but that the
simple ratio decidendi is that any accommodation party is primarily liable.
If this be the correct interpretation of the opinion, then
Winton vs. Sullivan must be deemed a "re-examination" of a
fundamental rule of commercial law and to constitute a
"shift" in doctrine. It will be interesting to observe what the
annotators do with Winton vs. Sullivan.
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ANNUAL MEETING OF STATE ASSOCIATION WILL
BE SEPT. 22, 23 AT BROADMOOR
By WILLIAM E. HUTTON*

HE forty-second annual meeting of the Colorado Bar

Association will be held at the Broadmoor Hotel on Friday and Saturday, September 22 and 23.

Charles A.

Beardsley of Oakland, California, the newly-elected president
*Of Denver, Chairman of Committee on Arrangements.
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of the American Bar Association, will deliver the annual address at the dinner on Friday evening.
The Junior Bar Conference will be held in conjunction
with the annual meeting. The program for the conference is
discussed elsewhere in this issue.
A very interesting program for the two days' meeting
is in process of arrangement. A group luncheon meeting will
be held Friday noon under the direction of the Law Club of
Denver, the members of which promise a novel and interesting
time. United States Attorney General Frank Murphy, Associate Justice Wiley Rutledge of the United States Court of
Appeals at Washington, D. C., Governor Ralph L. Carr and
other notables have been invited and have expressed a desire
to attend the meeting.
A one-half day Institute is planned for consideration of
the particular problems developed by the work of the Committee on Revision of the Code, under the direction of Colonel
Philip S. Van Cise. Special effort will be made this year to
furnish interesting entertainment for the ladies who accompany members to the meeting. Plans are being matured to
develop a fuller acquaintance among members of the state bar
and to give the younger members an opportunity to meet the
older members of the profession.
There is every prospect for an interesting, informative
and joyous occasion for our two days' meeting. It is hoped
that the judges, as usual, will endeavor to arrange the business of the courts so as to make feasible the attendance of all
judges and lawyers.
The rates at the Broadmoor for rooms with bath, European plan, will be as follows:
$3.50 per person, single
2.75 per person, double
2.34 per person, triple

For corner rooms and lanai suites:
$5.00 per person, single
4.00 per person, double

Accommodations will be assigned by the hotel in the
order in which reservation requests are received. For reservations, communicate directly with Mr. Burton R. Ogilvie,
Manager, Broadmoor Hotel. Members are urged to make
early reservations. Further details of the arrangements and
program will appear in a subsequent issue of DICTA.
ANNUAL MEETING-SEPTEMBER

22, 23, 1939, Colorado Springs.

REGIONAL CONFERENCE OF JUNIOR BAR
Scheduled for Colorado Springs
By MARK H. HARRINGTON*

HE Colorado Junior Bar Conference will hold its annual
meeting at the Broadmoor Hotel in Colorado Springs in
conjunction with the annual meeting of the Colorado
Bar Association on September 22 and 23. The conference is
a state unit of the Junior Bar Conference, and in recognition
of the activities of the Colorado unit during the past year, the
Junior Bar Conference has determined to turn the annual
meeting of the Colorado unit into a meeting of the members
of the conference of the tenth circuit, and it is expected, therefore, that this meeting will be attended by members of the conference from each of the five other states in the tenth circuit,
namely, Utah, Wyoming, New Mexico, Kansas and Oklahoma.
As a part of the program of the Colorado Bar Association, a luncheon will be held at the Broadmoor Hotel on Saturday noon, September 23. In addition to the election of
officers and members of the council from each of the judicial
districts in the state, there will be a discussion of the program
for the forthcoming year. While the Colorado Junior Bar
Conference has just completed its first year of activity, its
rapid growth has shown the widespread interest of the
younger members of the bar in bar organization problems in
general and particularly in those affecting the younger members of the bar. As a consequence, it is expected that more of
the younger lawyers of the state will attend the combined
meeting this year than have ever attended in the history of
the Colorado Bar Association.
Of added interest will be the attendance at the meeting
of Paul F. Hannah of Washington, D. C., the national chairman of the Junior Bar Conference. The members in attendance will also be privileged to hear A. Pratt Kesler of Salt
Lake City, the national vice-chairman, and James D. Fellers
of Oklahoma City, who represents the tenth cricuit on the
council of the conference.
*Of Denver, Colorado State Chairman, Junior Bar Conference.

SEPTEMBER 22, 23-ANNUAL MEETING-BROADMOOR HOTEL.

260

DICTA

261

All young attorneys of the state, whether members of the
conference or not, are urged to attend, not only to participate
in the meeting of the conference but also to attend the sessions
of the Colorado Bar Association and to participate in the entertainment program. It is hoped that our appreciation of
the attendance at the meeting of the national officers will be
shown by the attendance of a large number of the younger
attorneys of the state.
A special invitation to attend is being given this year to
the wives of our members. The attractive rates being offered
by the Broadmoor Hotel make this an excellent opportunity
to renew your associations and to make new friendships.

CODE REVISION INSTITUTE

ON

To Be Held in Denver, August 23 and 24

August 23rd and 24th the Code Revision Committee

will hold a two-day Institute at the Capitol Life Insurance Company Building, Denver, for the purpose
of expediting the work of the committee, and approving or
disapproving all rules for adoption by the sub-committees to
date. Each sub-committee is urged by Philip S. Van Cise,
general chairman, to complete its part of the work as far as
practicable by August 15th, and submit not later than August
17th to the general chairman a statement of its recommendation of the rules assigned to the sub-committee. Every member of the committee is urged to attend the Institute on these
days. The present plan calls for the Institute to begin at 9:30
each morning and to last through the entire day and evening.
The agenda prepared by Mr. Van Cise at the present time
is as follows:
1. All rules recommended for adoption without
amendment;
2. Discussion of all other rules;
3. Discussion of rules where slight amendments are
recommended;
ANNUAL MEETING-SEPTEMBER

22, 23, 1939, Colorado Springs.
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4. If time allows, sections of the code which are not
covered by the rules and which are being re-written to conform
to the theory of the rules.
Weekly meetings of the committee were discontinued on
July 24th, and no further meetings will be held by the committee until the Institute on August 23rd and 24th.
At previous meetings the Committee on Appellate Procedure has recommended that the federal rules should not be
adopted for appellate procedure in Colorado, but that the
writ of error practice was preferable. However, certain minor
rules, and Rule Number 75, relating to the supersedeas bond,
and the time to appeal, were resubmitted to the committee for
further investigation.
As suggested by the Committee on Judgments, Rule 61,
without change, was tentatively adopted, and except for
minor changes Rules 58 and 63 were tentatively adopted.
With the exception of paragraphs (c) and (e) which
were materially changed, Rule 56 was tentatively adopted and
Rules 68 and 70 were adopted with minor changes. Rule 59
was materially changed and adopted as changed.

Colorado Lawyers at A. B. A. Meeting Elected to Office in
National Association
HE Colorado Bar Association was well represented at the
meeting of American Bar Association in San Francisco
July 10 to 14. Thirty-two Colorado lawyers were registered and several others were present. No other state, except
California, had as large a registration in proportion to its lawyer population.
The Colorado lawyers who were registered had a meeting
on July 12 at which G. Dexter Blount of Denver resigned as
State Delegate of the American Bar Association for Colorado,
and James A. Woods was elected to fill out the unexpired term
of one year.
At the convention Mr. Blount was elected by the House
of Delegates a member of the Board of Governors of American
Bar Association, pursuant to nomination made at the midSEPTEMBER 22, 23-ANNUAL MEETING-BROADMOOR HOTEL.
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winter meeting of the State Delegates in Chicago last January.
He will serve in that capacity for three years. The Board of
Governors consists of one member from each of the ten Federal Judicial Circuits and the President, Secretary, Treasurer,
chairman of the House of Delegates and editor of the Journal.
Dean Robert L. Stearns of the University of Colorado
Law School was elected chairman of the Section on Legal Education and Stanley T. Wallbank of Denver was elected chairman of the Section of the National Conference of Bar Examiners.
These Colorado lawyers, together with Wilbur F. Denious of Denver, who last April was elected Delegate of the
Colorado Bar Association, have, by their elections, become
members of the House of Delegates of American Bar Association, which consists of approximately 170 members and is the
controlling body of that Association. As a result, the lawyers
of Colorado now have five representatives in the House of Delegates, which is a larger representation than any other state of
an equal or less size bar.
Colorado lawyers were prominent on the programs.
Judge Orie L. Phillips, William R. Kelley of Greeley, President-Elect Dean Robert L. Stearns and Lowell White of Denver delivered interesting and comprehensive addresses at meetings of sections.
These facts speak well of the bar of Colorado and the
active and enthusiastic interest of its members in the affairs of
both the American Bar Association and the Colorado Bar
Association.
A LEGAL INSTITUTE ON INSURANCE LAW
Pattersonof Columbia Lectures in Denver August 21 and 22
AKING advantage of the presence on the summer law
faculty in Boulder of Professor Edwin W. Patterson of
Columbia, one of the leading authorities in the country
on the law of insurance, the Denver Bar Association has arranged for a two-day legal institute to be held on Monday and
ANNUAL

MEETING-SEPTEMBER 22, 23, 1939, Colorado Springs.
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Tuesday, August 21 and 22, in the auditorium of the Capitol
Life Insurance Company at 16th Avenue and Sherman Street
on the topic "Current Problems of Insurance Law." In addition to members of the bar, laymen in the insurance business
will be welcome, and indications point to a considerable advance sale through the local underwriters association.
Denver lawyers who attended the law institute given a
year ago in April by Prof. W. Barton Leach of Harvard on the
subject of Real Property and the Drafting of Wills know the
value of lectures of this kind and will appreciate the opportunity to hear an equally eminent speaker in a field which is of
such practical every-day importance as insurance law. Professor Patterson is well qualified both from the standpoint of
knowledge of the topic, and from experience as a lecturer. He
conducted a very successful institute on this subject in Cleveland last fall which was attended by over four hundred lawyers. President Howard L. Barkdull of the Ohio State Bar
Association, member of the well known Cleveland firm of
Squire, Sanders and Dempsey, writes concerning it:
"The audience was much pleased. The subject was well
handled, the presentation was interesting and the general impression of those in attendance was very good. The appeal
was broad enough to make the institute valuable to everyone
in the audience."
In addition to teaching insurance law at Columbia for a
number of years, Professor Patterson has had some practical
experience as deputy superintendent of insurance of the State
of New York in 1936 and for two years was in charge of the
revision of the insurance law of New York, which was passed
by the legislature and will become effective next year. His
recognition as a scholar is indicated by the fact that he was the
adviser of the Restatement of the Law of Restitution for the
American Law Institute. His published works include: "The
Insurance Commissioner in the United States," 1927; "Cases
and Materials on Insurance," 1932; "Essentials of Insurance
Law," 1935, and a two-volume case book on Contracts. He
does not return to Colorado as a stranger, because after starting
in practice for a few years in Kansas City, he came to the law
SEPTEMBER 22, 23-ANNUAL MEETING-BROADMOOR
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faculty at Boulder, where he taught for several years until
1920.
An outline with citation of cases and text authorities will
be furnished at the opening of the institute. The first session
will be held on Monday afternoon, August 21, from 4:00 to
5:30 P. M., the second on Monday evening from 7:30 to
9:00, and the concluding lecture on the following afternoon
from 4:00 to 5:30. Series tickets sell for two dollars and may
be obtained by mailing your check to Secretary James A.
Woods or by purchase from the following members of the
ticket committee: Kenneth Wormwood, F. N. Holland, Fred
M. Winner, Finlay McF. Robinson and Benjamin E. Sweet.
As the capacity of the auditorium at the Capitol Life Insurance Company is limited, those interested are advised to secure
their tickets at once. Out-of-town lawyers will be especially
welcome.
Professor Patterson's discussion will touch on a number
of phases of the law of insurance and its modern developments.
The first lecture will be devoted to some general principles and
problems which are common to the insurance business in all
of its branches. The features of the insurance contract which
differentiate it from other contracts will be emphasized. In
this connection, the question will be discussed, what is "insurance" and "doing an insurance business"? This question is
of interest not only to insurance company counsel but also to
counsel for manufacturers, merchants and persons furnishing
services, many of whom have made contracts which were held
to invade the province of insurance and therefore to fall within
the scope of statutes regulating the insurance business.
Statutory regulation and administrative supervision will
be discussed, with reference to scope, general objectives, and
methods. The multiplicity of regulations due to different
types of insurance carriers-stock, mutual, fraternal, reciprocal-and the different kinds of insurance business-life, fire,
marine, casualty-will be pointed out. Brief reference will
be made to the movement for Federal supervision of all or
some parts of the insurance business.
The second part of the first lecture will be devoted to the
general principles of contract law, as applied or modified in the
ANNUAL MEETING-SEPTEMBER
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making and interpretation of insurance contracts. Offer and
acceptance, delivery of the policy, the parole evidence ruleand reformation for mistake, will be discussed. The general
analysis of waiver, estoppel, and election will be briefly presented at this point, to be elaborated more fully in the succeeding lectures, which relate to particular branches of the insurance business.
The second lecture will be devoted to fire and casualty
insurance, with only such reference to marine insurance as is
necessary to give the historical background of current legal
doctrines. The use of legal devices in the selection and control
of risks, by the insurer, will be outlined. The casualty insurance problems will be principally those of the liability insurance policy: the extended coverage clause, the right of the injured person against the insurer, cooperation by the insured
with the insurer, and the insurer's control of litigation and
settlement, including the insurer's liability to the insured for
failure to use its control properly. The fire insurance problems will include: insurable interest, measure of recovery, the
standard mortgagee clause, warranties and conditions affecting
the risk, and waiver, estoppel, and election.
The third lecture will be devoted to life insurance.
Among the topics to be discussed under this heading are:
insurable interest, the inception of the insurer's liability, misrepresentations by the insured, assignment and change of beneficiary, the incontestable clause and waiver, estoppel, and
election as applied in life insurance cases. The use of legal
devices in the selection and control of risks will be outlined.
The foregoing is not an exhaustive list of the points
which will be developed in the course of the discussion. Professor Patterson wishes to point out, however, that the limited
time will not permit exhaustive discussion of these topics with
full analysis of the authorities. Representative precedents will
be chosen for analysis.
Arrangements are in charge of the Law Institute Committee consisting of P. H. Holme, chairman, Ernest Fowler,
E. N. Freeman, Edward L. Wood and Robert L. Stearns.
Special thanks is due to Dean Stearns, through whose courtesy
Professor Patterson has been secured.
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LAW LECTURES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
COLORADO
In connection with the summer session at the Law School
at the University of Colorado at Boulder, a series of lectures
on legal topics has been arranged which will be of interest to
Colorado lawyers.
The first series of lectures will be on "Business Situations"
and will be given by Mr. Mayo H. Shattuck, of the Boston
bar, at 4:30 P. M. on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday,
August 15, 16 and 17. Mr. Shattuck is one of the leading
practicing lawyers in Boston, is an authority on the law of
trusts and has had wide experience in the general practice.
The second series of lectures will be on "The Drafting
of Wills and Trusts" and will be given by W. Barton Leach,
of the Harvard Law School faculty. They will be delivered
at 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon and 8 o'clock in the evening
of Friday, August 18th, and at 10 o'clock in the morning of
Saturday, August 19th. Mr. Leach, it will be remembered,
gave a most successful series of institute lectures on Powers
and Perpetuities, sponsored by the Denver Bar Association in
May of 1938.
All lectures will be delivered in the Moot Court Room
of the University Law School and will be open to all lawyers
without charge. A cordial invitation to attend is extended by
the students and faculty of the Law School.

ELIAS H. ELLITHORP
Elias H. Ellithorp, late of Alamosa, died on June 17,
1939. Mr. Ellithorp came to Colorado in 1905, and was
admitted to practice in 1906.
He served as County Judge of Costilla County and maintained an office in San Luis until 1923, at which time he moved
to Alamosa, and had resided in that city ever since.
At the time of his death he was 75 years of age; was born
in the State of New York in 1864.
He was first admitted to practice in New York in 1896.
Burial was at Monte Vista, Colorado.
-Jesse E. Pound, Correspondent.
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Stewart Shafer, our erstwhile regional correspondent,
formerly of Cortez, has moved to Denver and has opened up
offices in conjunction with W. Felder Cook in the Equitable
Building. James B. Garrison of Dolores will replace Mr.
Shafer as regional correspondent for that district.
John Henderson of Greeley left July 5th for a month's
vacation in Hawaii.
The Weld County Bar Association and the chamber of
commerce of Greeley united their efforts to play host to two
special trains of attorneys enroute to San Francisco from the
East to attend the American Bar Association Convention.
The specials stopped a short time in Greeley on July 3rd for
the celebration and to pick up local attorneys who joined the
trains to the convention.
Weld County Bar members, after greeting the attorneys,
distributed small satin sacks of beet sugar to the visitors as
mementoes of their visit to Weld County.
John W. Henderson, David J. Miller and John W.
O'Hagan constituted the reception committee.
-- John W. O'Hagan,Correspondent.
Carl Ahlborn, Jr., has opened an office at Fort Lupton.
Mr. Ahlborn formerly practiced law at Smith Center, Kansas.
He is the fifth new member of the Weld County Bar Association to be enrolled during the past year. With the enrollment
of Mr. Ahlborn's name, Weld County Bar Association has
now reached the quota set by the Colorado Bar Association.
PROSPECTIVE EARNINGS OF AGENTS
In advertising for salesmen or distributors it is unlawful to repre-

sent that they may possibly earn during any given time any specified

sum which is xiot a true representation of the average net earnings consistently made by the full-time agents of the advertiser. (Matter of
Hiram E. Barber, Beaver City, Nebraska, trading as Motor Equipment
Specialty Co., Federal Trade Commission Order No. 3617, April 10,
1939; Harold L. Rothschild, St. Paul, Minn., trading as Coronado
ManufacturingCo., Federal Trade Commission Order No. 2829, April
16, 1939.)

Supreme Court Decisions
LAW-People V.
Barksdale-No. 14347-Decided February 20, 1939-District
Court of Pueblo County-Hon. W. B. Stewart, Judge-Reversed.
HELD:
1. The trial court had jurisdiction of defendant and
of the subject matter in a suit brought on the relation of the Attorney
General to restrain defendant from violating Chapter 113, S. L. 1937,
being "an act relating to the regulation and supervision of the cleaning
and dyeing trade in the State of Colorado." The defendant was charged
with having Violated the provision which requires those in the industry
to demand for their services not less than the schedule of minimum retail
prices established by the Industrial Commission.
2. Complaint examined and found to state cause of action.
3.
A presumption of validity attaches to all legislation passed
by the General Assembly, and the presumption abides unless it is shown,
beyond a reasonable doubt, to be false.
4. The statement that the act was not properly passed by the
General Assembly, without alleging ultimate facts, is a bare legal conclusion, for nothing appears on face of complaint to so show.
5.
The contention that the "General Assembly has unlawfully
delegated legislative authority to the Industrial Commission is so contrary to all sound decisions with reference to the administrative phase
of modern social and economic legislation that .no authorities need
be cited."
6. The issue of invalidity on constitutional grounds should be
presented by an affirmative pleading.
7. The trial court should not admit evidence while considering
a demurrer.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Justice Burke dissents. Mr.
Justice Bakke and Mr. Justice Knous not participating. EN BANC.
FAIR TRADE LAW-PLEADING-CONSTITUTIONAL

Lumber Co. v. Water Supply Co.-No. 14387
-Decided February 20, 1939-District Court of Larimer County-Hon. Frederic W. Clark, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD:
I.
"The Colorado Statutes providing for the adjudicaticn of water priorities and for changing points of diversion are in the
nature of police regulations. 1935 C. S. A., c. 90. The sworn duty of
our irrigation officers-the State Engineer, the irrigation division engineers, and the water commissioners-is to give statewide enforcement to
those statutes. Decreed rights to use water diverted by irrigation ditches
in our State are of course intended by our General Assembly to be
supervised and administered by the irrigation officers in a way that will
WATER RIGHTS-Otto
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impartially secure the enjoyment of these rights by the various users in
relation to one another."
2. No valid reason is assigned by the petitioner for taking its
Colorado-decreed water out of the stream after it has reached Wyoming,
thus depriving Colorado of the power to continue undiminished the
exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction over the petitioner, as over all other
users to whom rights have been judicially awarded by our state.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. EN BANC.
REOPENING LIMITATION The Great
Western Reservoir and Canal Company v. Farmers Reservoir and

WATER ADJUDICATION -

Irrigation Company, et al.-No. 14305-Decided February 6,
1939-Error to the District Court of Boulder County. Hon.
Claude C. Coffin, Judge--Judgment Affirmed.
FACTS: Plaintiff in error filed petition to reopen a water adjudication decree on January 5,1937, relying on sec. 187, ch. 90, 1935 C. S. A.
for the right so to do. An answer, including a general demurrer, was
addressed to the petition, and after hearing on petition and answer, the
demurrer was sustained and petition dismissed.
Adjudication proceeding was instituted in October, 1912, and first
decree entered June 21, 1926, and a last decree was on January 9, 1935.
In the proceedings to reopen it was undisputed in the record that
the decree "complained of" by petitioner was that entered June 21,
1926. But the provision of the statute relied on provides in part that
there is a two-year period for review and reargument of "the decree
complained of."
HELD:
Decree of June 21, 1926, was final as to the question
presented by the petition of plaintiff in error.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice
Bouck concur. IN DEPARTMENT.

ACCOUNTS -

CHECKS

-

INTEREST

-

PAYMENT -

Smith-McCord-

Townsend Co. v. Camenga-No. 14351-Decided February 20,
19 3 9-District Court of Denver-Hon.George F. Dunklee, Judge.
Affirmed.
HELD:
1. Where one party presents to another a bill for a
book-account of.a certain amount, and the other makes a series of payments thereon and then sends another check containing the words
"acc't. in full," which check is accepted, and no objection made thereto
for two weeks, there is a complete settlement of the account, barring
fraud and mistakes.
2.
Two weeks under such circumstances was an unreasonable
length of time to delay making an objection or protest if the check
were not to be accepted for what it purported to be.
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3.
The trial court was right in assuming, apparently, that it is
the business of the credit manager of a mercantile corporation to be
conversant with matters relating to a check paid on an account and containing the words "acc't. in full."
4. Where interest on past due accounts is never segregated and
charged on the company's books, the payment by check stating, "acc't.
in full," and the acceptance of same precludes further charge for interest.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and Mr.
Justice Burke concur.
STATE--SUIT AGAINST-TORT-EMINENT DOMAIN-The

State of

Colorado v. The Colorado Postal Telegraph Co.-No. 14463Decided May 29, 1939-DistrictCourt of Denver-Hon. George
Dunklee, Judge-On application for supersedeas, judgment reversed.
FACTS: 1. The company instituted suit against the state to recover $2,331.88 damages alleged to have been caused by reason of excavations at the state hospital which endangered line and poles of the company, necessitating their removal. Alternative prayer that company's
damages be determined as in eminent domain proceeding by a commission of three freeholders or by a jury of freeholders.
2. Demurrer for insufficiency of facts, specifying: immunity of
state to suit; no one authorized to, or who can, accept service on behalf
of state; no way of satisfying a judgment except by appropriation.
3.
Demurrer overruled, and state elected to stand therein. Judgment for company.
HELD: 1. The state cannot be sued in its own courts without its
consent.
2.
"Since counsel for plaintiff in the instant case admit the general rule to be that the state cannot be sued without its consent, and since
they ground the exception to that rule which they claim permits the state
to be sued solely on Section 15, Article II of the state Constitution as
they contend it was construed in County Commissioners v. Alder, supra,
overholding that that section of the Constitution relates merely to the
matter of liability for an uncompensated taking or injury of property
and that the matter of the county's liability is all that was in issue or
determined in that case, leaves applicable the admitted general rule that
the state, without its consent, cannot be sued."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Bakke not participating. EN BANC.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-EVIDENCE-White v. IndustrialCommission-No. 14572-DecidedMay 15, 1939-DistrictCourt of
Denver-Hon.Stanley H. Johnson, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: W, general superintendent of employer company, was
injured by the explosion of his own gun with which he was attempting
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to kill a coyote. He claimed the animal was a "menace, nuisance and
detriment to company operation."
His claim for compensation was
denied upon the ground that his injury did not arise out of and in the
course of his employment.
HELD: 1. "Though all the evidence produced may come from
the claimant, and viewed in its most favorable light, support an award
for him, if it justifies adverse inferences which the commission clearly
draws a contrary award will be upheld."
2. The commission is entitled to consider all admitted and selfevident facts in the case, and apply to those, and to claimant's theory of
his employment and duties, the common knowledge of common men in
this state.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Young and Mr. Justice Bakke concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
ESTATES-INHERITANCE TAX-EXEMPTION-People, ex rel. Rogers

v. Colorado National Banh, etc.-No. 14425-Decided May 15,
1939-County Court of Denver-Hon. C. E. Kettering, JudgeAffirmed.
HELD: 1. Where the widow, under the provisions of a will, held
only a life estate, the amount of which was reasonably ascertainable; and
where it appears that its value was less than the amount of her statutory
exemption, and that the remainder was left for charitable purposes, the
estate is exempt from the imposition of any inheritance tax.
2. Where there is no possibility, or probability, of invasion into
the corpus of the estate, or if the amount passing to charity could be
ascertained, no tax is to be paid.
3. "If the devise to charity is reasonably certain, no tax, under
the facts, is due the state." Had the will, in its provisions for the maintenance for the widow for life, made the devise to charity mere guesswork
and speculation, the tax would have been properly assessed.
4. The trial court correctly followed the principles laid down in
Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 151, 49 Sup. Ct. 291, 73
L. Ed. 647, as distinguished from the case of Humes vy. United States,
276 U. S. 487, 48 Sup. Ct. 347, 72 L. Ed. 667.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Justice Burke and Mr. Justice
Young concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
DIVORCE-CUSTODY OF MINOR CHILD---MODIFICATION OF PREVIOUS
DECREE-ATTORNEY'S FEES-Averch v. Averch-No. 14568-

Decided May 15, 1939-DistrictCourt of Denver-Hon. George
F. Dunhlee, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: In 1935, divorce action between the parties culminated
in a final decree by which mother of child was granted a divorce and
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custody of the child for 42 weeks each year, with the privilege of taking
child out of state. In 1935, father went to New York and, under the
decree, obtained custody of the child for ten weeks and returned her to
Denver where he was advised she needed an operation. The mother consented and the operation was performed. More medical services were
needed and the father did not return the child to the mother in New
York at the end of the ten weeks. The medical testimony showed that
the child could be treated in New York. The trial court refused to hold
the father in contempt and suggested that he file a petition seeking permanent custody of the child. The court denied mother's petition for
custody and granted the father permanent custody until further order
of the court.
HELD: 1. The general rule in cases involving the custody of
minor children is that "the interest and welfare of the child is the primary and controlling question."
2. To deprive a parent of the custody of the child and to justify
a modification of the decree previously awarding the custody to the
mother for 42 weeks in each year, it is necessary that a change of circumstances be shown, or new facts presented, to justify the modification.
3. Courts will not deprive the mother of the custody of her child
unless it is clearly shown that she is so unfit a person as to endanger the
child's welfare.
4. Considering the evidence, the trial court was arbitrary and
abused its discretion in modifying the decree.
5. The mother was entitled to attorney fees, reasonably expended
in attempting to enforce the previous decree.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Justice Bouck not participating. EN BANC.
UNEMPLOYMENT

COMPENSATION

CONTRIBUTIONS

-

RULES

AND

REGULATIONS-AGRICULTURAL LABOR-Park Floral Co. v.Industrial Commission-No. 14455-Decided May 15, 1939District Court of Denver-Hon. George F. Dunklee, JudgeAffirmed.
FACTS: Action instituted by Industrial Commission under the
Colorado Unemployment Act to recover unemployment compensation
contributions from the floral company upon the basis of wages paid by
that company to its employees. The company contended that the labor
of its employees comes within the exemption of the statute which provides that the "term 'employment' shall not include (D) agricultural
labor."
HELD: 1. The Industrial Commission, acting within the scope
of the rule-making authority conferred by the Act, defined the term
"agricultural labor." Its regulation on such question is in keeping with
the clear intent of the enactment.
2. "* * * That it may be claimed to be not entirely appropriate
to an isolated and in some respects unique situation such as that pre-
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sented here is no adequate ground for condemning a rule which in its
general practical operation is not shown to be unreasonable or unjust."
3. The legislature, having declared the policies and fixed the primary standards, may validly confer on administrative officers power to
"fill up the details" by prescribing rules and regulations to promote the
spirit and purpose of the legislation and its complete operation.
4. In determining "agricultural labor," the place, the method
and manner of production, as well as labor practices employed must be
weighed.
5.
The technical distinction that mushrooms are grown in darkness and the flowers grown and sold by the company are grown in light
is of no consequence in this matter where the Act looks to the achievement of social security for labor and not to the classification of fruits of
the soil.
6. The defendant floral company cannot escape the effect of the
Act merely because it has some "seasonable" fluctuation of employment
of some of its employees.
7. Greenhouses and retail stores of a floral company cannot be
said to be "farms in the ordinarily accepted sense," and the company's
employees are not to be classed as "agricultural labor."
8. The administrative rulings under the Federal Social Security
Act, exempting the operations of greenhouses, are not controlling upon
the state courts.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Bouck not participating. EN BANC.
LIABILITY INSURANCE-SUIT BY INJURED PARTY AGAINST INSURER
OF DEFENDANTCONTRACTS -EVIDENCE
-Warner v. Farr-

er's Automobile Inter-InsuranceExchange-No. 14548-Decided
May 15, 1939-DistrictCourt of Larimer County-Hon. Claude
C. Coffin, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Plaintiff obtained judgment for damages against one H.
The defendant insured H against liability and plaintiff sued defendant to
collect the amount of the judgment. Defendant claimed that the policy
had been cancelled ten days before the accident which caused the damages.
The replication alleged waiver of premium and denied cancellation of
policy. The trial court directed a verdict for the company.
HELD: I. Evidence examined and found to leave no question for
the jury as to the cancellation of the policy.
2. Subsection 9, Section 19, Chap. 87, Vol. 3, 1935 C. S. A.,
clearly exempts the company from obligations arising from any oral
statements not in the contract.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Young and Mr. Justice Burke concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
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REAL ESTATE-DEDICATION OF STREETS-NON-USER-FAILURE TO

v. Brewer, et al.-No.
14567-Decided May 22, 1939-District Court of Adams

ACCEPT-DAMAGES-PLEADING-Hunt

County-Hon. Samuel W. Johnson, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Plaintiff brought suit to enjoin defendants from misusing
a street which she contends is dedicated to public use. The trial court

dismissed the complaint. The original townsite was platted in 1889,
but there never was an acceptance of the dedication. In 1933, the de-

fendants subdivided and replatted certain blocks and vacated part of the
street, recording a plat thereof. Plaintiff contends that she is the owner
of two blocks between which the street extends and that she has an abso-

lute legal right to have the avenue maintained as originally platted.
HELD: 1. A citizen, if likely to be injured in his individual
rights with respect to his property by a misuser or diversion of dedicated
property, may maintain an action to enforce or preserve the use. This
right is not absolute, and may be lost by failure of acceptance and nonuser in connection with other circumstances indicating an intent not to
use the property for the purpose to which it was dedicated.
2. An acceptance of a dedication is necessary.
3. Where there has been no statutory dedication, but only a common law offer to dedicate the streets and alleys marked on a plat of a
subdivision, and no acceptance or user of any portion of such streets and
alleys, the execution and recording of proper deeds of vacation withdraws
and cancels that portion of the plat included in such deeds.
4. Damages claimed are wholly prospective and speculative.
5. Plaintiff has ingress to and egress from her property through
other streets.
6. In such cases, a mere allegation of irreparable injury is insufficient-the facts must be stated.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Young and Mr. Justice Burke concur.

IN DEPARTMENT.

LAW - ANTI-PICKETING LAWS - LABOR - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DAMAGES-People v. Harris-No. 14309-Decided May 29, 1939-District Court of Denver-Hon. H. A.
Hicks, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: H charged in two counts with picketing. He pleaded
not guilty, a jury was waived, and the case submitted on a stipulation
of facts. He was adjudged not guilty and discharged. District Attorney
sues out writ of error.
HELD: 1. "It is quite universally conceded now that labor has
the right to organize and to lawfully protect its economic interests."
2. "By the great weight of authority, peaceful picketing, so long
as it does not in fact involve fraud, intimidation, breach of the peace, or
coercion, has been sustained in many cases."
CRIMINAL
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3.
"That the employer has the right to refuse to pay union wages
and maintain union standards is conceded. Correspondingly, labor has
the right to decline to carry on any business relation with such an employer. Any loss which occurs in such economic controversies is damnum
absque injuria."
4. Peaceful picketing for a lawful purpose is permissible.
5.
A statute which is construed to prohibit peaceful picketing of
any kind, at any time, at any place near the employer's premises, and in
any manner, is unconstitutional as being in violation of the due-processof-law provision contained in Amendment XIV of the United States
Constitution.
6. This does not deprive the state from regulating the picketing.
7. The right to peacefully picket rests upon the right of free
speech.
8. "Any legislative exercise under the police power which violates
any right guaranteed by the national or state Constitutions is invalid."
9. "It cannot be successfully maintained that guaranties of freedom of speech are less important than guarantees relating to property."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Justice Bakke concurs specially. Mr. Justice Bouck not participating. EN BANC.
PUBLIC UTILITIES-CARRIERS-HIGHWAYS-POLICE

POWER REGU-

LATION-McKay v. Public Utilities Commission, et al.-No.
14320-Decided May 29, 1939-District Court of DenverHon. Stanley H. Johnson, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: The Public Utilities Commission found that the respondent trucker was operating as a common carrier in intrastate commerce
without first having obtained a certificate of public convenience and necessity therefor, and it entered an order cancelling his private permit for
having done so and requiring him to cease and desist from so continuing.
The order of the commission included the provision that the respondent
could retain his private permit if he paid a $200 penalty and ceased operating as a common carrier.
HELD: 1. Although the respondent and the commission joined
in asking the Supreme Court, "in view of the confusion, growing pains
and chaos of truck transportation in this state," to establish definite principles of conduct governing truck-carrier operations, the Supreme Court
has no power to establish such principles. It may only ascertain the legislative intent and interpret the statutes and decide whether, under the
facts and circumstances, the commission was authorized to enter the
orders of which complaint is made.
2. Home rule cities are not under the authority of the Public Utilities Commission in the regulation of motor vehicle common carriers
whose operations are limited to the municipal area.
3. There is a distinction between the private and public use of
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highways. The right of the citizen to travel upon the highway and
transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business differs radically and obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place of business and uses it for private gain. The former is the
usual and ordinary right of a citizen, a common right, while the latter
is special, unusual and extraordinary.
4. As to the common right, the legislative power is that of regulation; but as to the special right, the legislative power is broader, and
the right may be wholly denied, or it may be permitted to some and
denied to others.
5.
"The legislative intent is clear, that the authorization of private carriers shall not be detrimental, within the limits of the law, to
common-carrier operation. No permit as a private carrier can be granted
by the commission if in its opinion, based upon proper evidence, such
private-carrier operation impairs the efficient public service of an authorized common carrier serving the same territory or over the same highways or routes."
6. It is in the public interest to preserve common-carrier operation.
7. It is immaterial that there are inconsistencies between findings
of the commission and those of the District Court on the evidence adduced before the commission, since the findings of the District Court
were gratuitous. "Where the district court affirms the order of the commission, and if the latter does not exceed its authority, and the evidence
sustains the orders, the findings of the court are immaterial."
8.
"Indiscriminately accepting freight is undoubtedly'one of the
important tests in ascertaining whether or not a certain operation has
the elements of a common carrier. The claim that one is a private carrier,
regardless of volume and number of shippers served is erroneous.
9. One may not, on a private-carrier permit, operate a regular
scheduled service with two trucks between Denver and Sterling five times
weekly, have a freight dock at each terminal, have one-third of the volume of freight between Denver and Sterling, receive all freight offered for
carriage except in a certain isolated instance, accept freight on joint
through rates at Denver as well as Sterling from private and commoncarrier operators, list joint motor vehicle carriers as customers, issue advertising cards and distribute them to prospective customers thereby holding himself out to the public as being engaged in the trucking business.
10. The law does not permit private carriers to accept freight
originating on, or destined to points on, lines of connecting carriers, nor
the transportation of such shipments on joint through rates or otherwise.
11. The contention that the practice of the respondent was commonly engaged in by other private carriers and that the practice had been
condoned or tacitly approved by the commission is of no avail, for no
power exists in a commission to approve any unlawful operation. "The
doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked against any governmental agency,
acting in its public capacity."
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12. It is unlawful for a private carrier to hold himself out to the
public as authorized to transport indiscriminately as a common carrier
without having first obtained a certificate of public convenience and necessity therefor, and where his advertising so holds him out to the public,
he is guilty of the violation of the law.
13. It is proper for the Public Utilities Commission to find, if the
facts so showed, that respondent was operating as a common carrier in
interstate commerce and as a private carrier in intrastate commerce over
the same route, at the same time, with the same equipment and under
the same trade name.
14. "One cannot devote his property to a public use by utilizing
one part of his truck for common-carrier service and another part of the
same truck for private-carrier service."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice
Bakke not participating. EN BANC.
WATER DISTRICTS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LIENS-ESTOPPELHome Owner's Loan Corporationv. Public Water Works District
-No. 1453 1-Decided May 29, 1939-DistrictCourt of Pueblo
County-Hon. William B. Stewart, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Action by Home Owner's Loan Corporation to restrain
the defendant from refusing or failing to deliver water to and upon residence property in Pueblo, on which plaintiff held first deed of trust. The
trial court sustained demurrer to complaint. The defendant district was
organized under a special statute (S. L. 1905, Chapter 142), which gave
the district a first lien for water assessments on property for which water
is furnished and made such lien paramount to all liens except general
taxes.
HELD: 1. Where it appears that a portion of an Act has been
held unconstitutional, and that when the unconstitutional portion is
stricken out, that which remains is complete in'itself, and capable of being executed in accordance with apparent legislative intent wholly independent of that which was rejected, the balance of the Act must be
sustained.
2. Where the title to the Act states that it is "to provide for the
creation of public water works districts * * * and for the management
of the same," such title includes the system of financing the district and
the provision concerning the lien is certainly clearly germane to such
system.
3. Where the statute provides that the water charges "shall become and be a continuing lien," unreasonable delay in shutting off the
water for non-payment of water bills is a factor irrelevant to the enforcement of the lien in conformity with the enabling statute, and the
doctrine of estoppel does not apply against the district.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Bock dissent. Mr. Justice Bouck not participating. EN
BANC.
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CHAIN STORE LICENSE LAW-Bedford, etc.v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.

-No. 14390-Decided May 29, 1939-DistrictCourt of Denver
-Hon. Robert W. Steele, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: The company, a Delaware corporation, with its principal
office at Minneapolis, Minnesota, was engaged in business of selling merchandise and operated 230 retail stores in twenty northwestern states,
five of which stores were operated in Colorado. In addition to these five
stores, the company sells merchandise to certain locally owned stores in
Colorado under a uniform contract agreement, by which these stores are
given the right to use the name "Gamble Store Agency." The company
claims that these agency stores were wholly individually owned, controlled and operated by the local agency operators and so contend there
is no liability for the graduated license fees on multiple stores imposed
by the Act (Chain Store License Act-Chapter 216, S. L. 1935). The
state contends that the operation of the stores was "ultimately controlled" and "directed" by the company, and that they really constitute
a chain of stores under the statute. The trial court decided in favor of
the company.
HELD: 1. Where it appears that the agency stores operate under
a uniform contract under which the company agrees to sell to the agency
operator, at prices to be established by the company, such merchandise
as the company carries in its own stores; where company agrees to make
adjustments for any merchandise so sold which in the opinion of the
company was defective at the time of sale; where it grants to the agency
operator the right to paint his store with the distinguishing blue and
orange colors used by the company on its "Gamble Stores"; where, upon
request of operator, agrees to advise him relative to methods of merchandising, and, upon payment for same by him, agrees to furnish circulars
and other advertising of the same general character used by the company
in its regular stores; where the contract provides that, unless otherwise
authorized in writing, the operator will purchase merchandise from the
company at one of its stores within the state, and pay for the goods cash
on delivery, etc., and that he will constantly exhibit the merchandise
prominently; where the operator agrees to exercise his best efforts to
maintain and increase sales of the company's merchandise, and is given
the right to use the name of "Gamble Store Agency" to advertise that
the local store is selling merchandise purchased from the company; where
it appears that he shall not use the words "Gamble Stores," that he shall
not designate such store as being owned, controlled, supervised, operated
or maintained by the company, that he shall not have authority to make
any binding agreement on behalf of company; where it appears that the
contract may be terminated by either party on 30 days' written notice;
and where it appears that upon termination of contract company may
re-purchase merchandise purchased from it and may buy the fixtures in
the store and take over the unexpired lease; and where certain other practices occur; it is clear that "on the one side there is an intimacy of regulation and on the other a fullness of submission which imports ultimate
control in the company."
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2. "Control" in a strict legal sense is not a requisite to the liability
for the tax.
3. The conduct of such stores constitutes a form and method of
merchandising quite apart from that adapted to the practice of the ordinary individually operated small store or department store.
4. The conclusion is irresistible that the purpose of the contract
was to initiate a system from which both parties could reap all the advantages of chain store operation with immunity from the burdens thereof.
5.
While there is a distinction between chain stores and a voluntary cooperative association of individual stores, the stores involved in
this matter are construed to be chain stores within the meaning of the
statute. "The element of mutuality between the agency store operators,
fundamental in a true cooperative association, is wholly lacking."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Bouck not participating. EN BANC.
MUTUAL DITCH COMPANIES-EQUITY-FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT
ON CONFLICTING COMPETENT TESTIMONY-PURCHASE OF
OWN SHARES OF COMPANY-Guadalupe Ditch Co., et al. v.

Manassa Land and IrrigationCo.-No. 14282-Decided May 29,
1939-DistrictCourt of Conejos County-Hon. John I. Palmer,
Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Suit by Manassa Company to enjoin defendants from
selling any of the shares of stock of defendant company held by plaintiff
for the non-payment of assessments or charges on account of the shares
of stock of the defendant company owned by the plaintiff company.
Plaintiff, by reason of its stock ownership in defendant company, was
entitled to 29.79 second-feet of water. With consent of plaintiff and
defendant, a decree changing the point of diversion of such water was
entered in a previous matter. At such time the defendant levied assessments an all the stock in the mutual ditch company for purpose of placing the ditch in good repair so as to more efficiently carry the diminished
stream remaining. Plaintiff contended it had an agreement with defendant company that upon paying a large part of the assessments to so
repair the ditch, the defendant company would not in the future look to
the plaintiff company for assessments to further maintain a ditch from
which it derived no benefits. The trial court held that there probably
was such an agreement, but that the evidence as to its terms was insufficient to authorize a finding as to what they were. It appeared that later
the plaintiff presented a request that it be given a quit-claim deed to the
water it was diverting and that it be permitted to withdraw from defendant company. No action was taken on this proposal, although at subsequent annual meetings of the defendant company the matter was considered but no one knew how the withdrawal could be effected. At a still
later meeting, the minutes show that it was agreed that upon payment
of $600.00 of the assessments the plaintiff company be released from
further assessments. The minutes state that the money was to be paid
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within sixty days. Lower court held plaintiff was entitled to restraining
order.
HELD: 1. The 60-day provision was to allow for the technical
work of separating the plaintiff company's holdings from those of the
defendant.
2. The finding of the lower court on competent though conflicting evidence that the understanding between the parties was that the
$600.00 was to be in full settlement, not only of defendant's claim for
assessments, but that the interest of plaintiff company was to be separated from the defendant company to avoid future controversies of the
same nature, will not be disturbed.
3.
All that Section 145, Chapter 41, 1935 C. S. A. requires, if
what was done amounted in legal effect to a purchase by the defendant
company of its stock representing water used by plaintiff company, is
that the resolution of settlement be adopted at annual meeting by twothirds of the stock, exclusive of the shares involved in the transaction.
This was done.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Bouck, Mr. Justice
Bock and Mr. Justice Burke not participating. EN BANC.

NEGLIGENCE-LAST CLEAR CHANCE-EVIDENCE-GUEST STATUTE
-Dwinelle, et al. u. U. P. R. R.-No. 14379-Decided July 3,
1939-District Court of Boulder County-Hon. Frederic W.
Clark, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD:
1. In an accident resulting in the death of a guest in a
truck which was struck by a train, where it appears that the driver of the
truck could and should have avoided the accident, the operator of the
train is not responsible, for such facts establish primary negligence on
the part of the driver of the truck and absence of primary negligence on
the part of train operator.
2. Since the conduct of the driver of the truck was so inconsistent
with all that was disclosed concerning the truck driver's duty, knowledge, skill and experience, the court cannot say that the jurors were precluded from assuming that he must for the time being have relinquished
his seat to the passenger. If that in fact occurred, plaintiffs, as heirs of
the guest, may not recover damages for primary or contributory negligence against either the owner of the truck or the owner of the engine.
3.
The trial court did not err in taking the case against the railroad from the jury, since the evidence does not warrant the application
of the last clear chance doctrine.
4. If the impending peril in which the parties found themselves
was due entirely to the negligence of guest and truck driver, and yet was
discovered by the engineer, or, in the exercise of reasonable care, ought to
have been discovered by him, in time to avert the accident, the doctrine
applies and the cause should have gone to the jury against the railroad-
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but the undisputed evidence is that under existing conditions it would
have been impossible for the engineer to have avoided the impact.
5. Where the evidence discloses a mere possibility that the engineer might have avoided the collision, and that that possibility rests on
split seconds, it is not enough to meet the rule. "It may present a last,
but not a clear, chance."
6. The court did not err in excluding testimony of plaintiff's
witnesses as to possible effect of engineer's speed by sanding the rails,
since the witnesses showed themselves unacquainted- with the type of
engine, its equipment, or manner of operation.
7. An affidavit as to what was stated in informal chambers conferences was properly stricken, since such conferences are not a part of
the record of the trial.
8. The court did not materially err in admitting a statement made
prior to accident by deceased guest in truck that his "family had turned
him down." Plaintiffs contend that the admission was erroneous and
highly prejudicial because the Act is not a survival statute, hence such
declarations were not admissible against plaintiffs as heirs. The purpose
of the Act, under which suit was brought, was to compensate those who
suffer pecuniary loss by reason of the death. The error, if any, is trivial
and not reversible, since the jurors were instructed that plaintiffs had no
cause of action unless decedent would have had such if death had not
ensued. If decedent had lived such statements against interest would
have been admissible.
9. Evidence examined as to truck driver's intention, intoxication
and willful and wanton disregard of decedent's rights, and found not to
be such as to overcome the restrictions of the guest statute.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and Mr.
Justice Bakke concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
HEIRSHIP-ESTATES-DEPOSITIONS-NOTICE OF DEPOSITIONS TO
PARTY ENTERING APPEARANCE SUBSEQUENTLY-In the Matter

of the Estate of John Webb-No. 14398-DecidedJune 12, 1939
-District Court of La Plata County-Hon. John I. Palmer,
Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Claimants contend they are the heirs of Webb. County
Court found Webb died without heirs. District Court reversed same and
found claimants to be the heirs. Depositions used in the County Court
before the state was a party were permitted to be used in the District
Court.

HELD:

1. The evidence established the heirship beyond a doubt.

The state's contention that the depositions could not be used against it

because of the statutory provision for notice is not good because when
the depositions were taken the state was not a party and not entitled to
notice.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke. IN DEPARTMENT.
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Owner's Loan Corporation v. Public Water Works-No. 14531
-Decided May 29, 1939-District Court of Pueblo CountyHon. William B. Stewart, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Plaintiff, which held a first deed of trust upon residence
property in Pueblo, sought to restrain defendant from refusing to deliver
water to said residence. Defendant is a water district created under Act
of 1905. Said Act provides that defendant's charges shall become and
be a continuing lien upon the premises and be prior to all liens except
those for general taxes. A portion of the said 1905 Act was declared
unconstitutional in a previous case.
HELD:
1. That the provision for the lien and the balance of the
Act was not unconstitutional in spite of the legislative omission of the
severability clause because said portions were not interdependent upon
the part previously declared unconstitutional.
2. Furthermore, the Act is not unconstitutional, for the wording
of the Act is germane to the title.
3. Defendant is not estopped for not previously exercising its
rights because its lien is by statute made a "continuing lien."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Bock dissent.

EN BANC.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION-ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE OF APPOINTMENT -MANDAMUS
- DEMAND-PLEADING--Raymond

v. State Civil Service Commission-No. 14587-DecidedJune 12,
1939-DistrictCourt of Denver-Hon. George F. Dunklee, Judge
-Reversed.
HELD: 1. It is the duty of the Civil Service Commission to furnish to one who has been a duly appointed, qualified and acting grade B
examiner in the Income Tax Department of the State Treasurer's office
a certificate that the appointment was made pursuant to law; and it is no
defense for the commission to assert that the payroll certified by the
State Treasurer was incorrect and did not agree with the records on file
with the commission.
2. The difference in the payroll did not affect the right of petitioner to the certificate.
3.
"It is elementary that to properly raise a triable issue, an answer must be responsive to the complaint."
4. "* * * To be properly available, a defense must of necessity
be against the claim asserted by the plaintiff."
5. A writ of mandamus will not be issued under pleadings which
show that no demand was made for the issuance of the certificate.
6. Relator in a mandamus suit must have demanded performance
of the act or duty which he seeks to enforce. Where the duty sought to
be enforced is of a public nature affecting the people at large and there is
no one especially empowered to demand performance, it has been held,
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as a well recognized exception to the general rule, that no demanrd is
necessary as a condition precedent to the issuance of a writ of mandamus
to compel performance.
7. But, where the duty is of a private nature affecting right of
relator only, the general rule, requiring previous demand, applies.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Bouck not participating.

EN BANC.

NOTES-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-Christensen v. Hugh M. Woods

Mercantile Co.-No. 14589-Decided June 12, 1939-District
Court of Denver-Hon. Frederic W. Clark, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS:

Suit on a note.

Defendant pleaded the statute of limita-

tions.

Plaintiff alleged certain payments to toll the statute.
HELD: Our statute requires corroboration of payments. Mere
book entries are insufficient. The entered credits in this case were without the necessary evidentiary support.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard. IN DEPARTMENT.
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